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As of 08/30/2007 there have been 84 Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths



2006 Total
106 LODD

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Fire Based EMS

"Simply The Best"

 

Franklin Professional

Firefighters

I.A.F.F. Local 2760

 

Safety Concerns

Regarding

Unsafe Department Operations

And

Proposed Budget Cuts

Fall 2002

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There comes a time when each of us are forced to except the realities of life, all to often this one of the saddest days of our lives as well.  Before we, the Cities Firefighters, you, the elected officials of the City of Franklin, and the community are faced with this situation here in Franklin let us all take the time to reflect on the words uttered by the writer John Donne in 1624

"No man is an island, entire of itself, every man is a piece of the continent."

While Donne was referring to his belief of the universe, and interactive nature of mankind, his words when looked upon in a different direction point to an obvious analogy to the fire department. A fire department is very much like a universe, and each and every day all of it’s members are expected to do their part of the work of the department.

By sharing the arduous and dangerous nature of the work of a firefighter, each firefighter gains the symbiotic enhancement of every other firefighter working together for the team, each of them becoming more than they can individually. Each of them, as a member of properly staffed engine or ladder company, becomes capable of doing more than any one of them could ever be expected to do as an individual. As a firefighter each of our destinies is intimately woven into the tapestry of the fire department. We live by the motto that they are brothers/sisters and together the fire company forms the basic team within the universe of the fire department. The fire department must build from this principle if it is to survive.  If we abandon this idea we are doomed to fail, and unfortunately the fire service does fail from time to time. In fact , the fire service is failing at an average of approximately 120 times a year, each time resulting in the death of a firefighter, not to mention the thousands of duty related injuries.

The time to act and prevent this failure is now.  We tend to forget these lessons we read and learn about from time to time. We are all busy and it is easy to forget that when firefighters fail it can be, and is often, accompanied with a deadly outcome. We all need to get a firm grip on our souls are recognize that there may be a problem in Franklin forced upon us by the State, but there are a number of ways to fix the problem, but cutting the Fire Department’s Budget even a penny or reducing staffing isn’t one of them.

A tragedy in Ipswich Massachusetts, a community even smaller than the City of Franklin, in January 2001, took the lives of a mother and her two children. A third child was saved when her mother threw her out of the third floor window of their blazing home. What makes this story so heart breaking is that the first unit that arrived at the fire was a hook and ladder truck, with a lone firefighter on board.

No one can say with any certainty that a full, minimal complement of 12 firefighters responding on two engine companies and a truck under a chief officer would have saved these people. But its easy to understand that one guy, all by himself, was not enough, no matter how brave or valiant that man was.

We believe that the citizens of Franklin, the City Administrator and the politicians, would recognize that one man is an adequate response to anything? That poor guy, there all by himself will have to live the rest of his days with the thoughts of that sad night’s tragic events. Any guilt he feels comes as a result of those political people who think that one firefighter is enough. And lest you think that this level of response is a rarity, consider the staffing in the Franklin Fire Department.  A department who’s leaders and elected officials have become comfortable with the fact that they staff the City’s fire engines in two thirds of the City with only a second person.

This is just a taste of the world that the Franklin Firefighter lives and works with or more appropriately without on a daily basis.  Recent decisions regarding station locations, response time needs, staffing deployment and budgeting prompted this report. 

The original intent of this report was to review these decisions and the impact they have had on the Franklin Fire Department, the safe working conditions for the employees of the department, the ability to do the job we have been sworn to do and that which the citizens expect and more importantly depend upon us to do, and lastly to provide you with information to show that any cuts in Fire Department Personnel should not be considered.

This report will show how newly developed and quantifiable national safety standards regarding fire department staffing and the deployment of staff are blatantly being ignored.  As you read this report we believe that it will become very apparent that the Franklin Fire Department is understaffed in relationship to these new standards as well as many existing national standards and recommendations.  This report will further show that this understaffing not only posses a threat to the citizens, their property, but also to the Firefighters who work for the City of Franklin.

Furthermore we want you to understand that proposed cuts in our budget although you may not consider them as critical as cutting staffing. That the cutting of budgetary funds for Training, Fire Safety Inspections, Fire Education, and other ideas that may reduce the budget, but you must be aware that the Fire Department has and is one of the leanest budgets in the city.  The funds the department is allocated for it operation are all-critical and do interweave to make the system we have work.  

A reduction in Training can mean more injuries, or greater fire loss, as can the reduction in quantity and quality of Fire Inspections.  The Fire Education we provide the children of our community is the foundation for a fire safe community, and we all understand that no structure can stand without a sound foundation.

While contemplating budget reductions and program eliminations please take a second to consider the following items which won’t show up on any list of budgetary expenses, of cost saving measure but do impact the budget everyday.  The firefighter in addition to performing their own duties as Firefighters, EMT’s and Paramedics also do much more.  We perform all of the following functions that few, if any other departments are required to do: Janitorial Services, Lawn care and Maintenance, Building Maintenance, Plumbing repair, Painters, Electrical Repair, Secretarial Work, Auto and Truck Maintenance and repair, Auto Body Repair, Carpenter Work. 

Without the quality employees that work in the fire department who give so much of them selves to provide these additional services the fire department’s budget would/could be even higher and all that we are asking in return is to give us the tools, equipment and money to allow the fire department to run in a safe and efficient manner.  To begin plans to correct current unsafe working conditions and do not allow working conditions to decline any further.

As we discussed in the opening one of our major concerns is that our current staffing levels fall well below the new national Standard of care.  The remainder of this report will support this issue.  We do this not only in an attempt to point out that there is not way to safely cut the fire departments staffing and/or budget, but to provide you with information that can be used to begin to plan to bring the fire department’s staffing up to a level which provides for a safe working environment for the firefighters and a safe community for the residents of the City of Franklin.

 NFPA 1710 Fire Department Staffing Guideline

The mission of the NFPA is "to improve the methods of fire protection and prevention" and to establish "proper safeguards against loss of life and property" due to fire.  The NFPA 1710 Standard was created to meet the overwhelming need for just such a standard. It represents the culmination of more than a decade of work by the NFPA Standards Council, its Technical Committees and its membership. The result is a comprehensive, uniform and practical standard governing fire and rescue service deployment by career fire departments throughout North America.

While modern science has been well integrated into many areas of emergency response, it is glaringly absent in the area of fire/rescue organization and deployment. Fire growth and behavior are scientifically measurable, as are the expected outcomes associated with untreated cardiac arrest, and the specific resource requirements to control fires and to prevent deaths. Despite these facts, many communities approach fire/rescue organization and deployment as if it were all art and no science -- and abstract art, at that.

The NFPA 1710 Standard applies the documented and proven science of fire behavior and emergency medicine to the basic resource requirements for effective fire and emergency service deployment. This application allows a community to determine if the resources allocated for the different types of fires, emergencies, medical calls and other incidents are sufficient to effectively control the incident and protect lives and property.

The NFPA 1710 Standard sets forth in concise terms the recommended resource requirements for fires, emergencies and other incidents.  This common sense, science-based formula categorically disproves the fallacy of the "something is better than nothing" model, which results in unnecessary risk for the public and for responders. The approach embodied in NFPA 1710 will make communities and fire fighters safer and responders more effective and efficient.

The "scope" and "purpose" of 1710 help to define what the standard does and what it covers. In both cases, the standard defines the minimum acceptable requirements, while still allowing more stringent or more comprehensive ones if a community so decides.

With respect to scope, these minimum requirements relate to how fire, EMS and special operations are organized and deployed in departments that are substantially career. If there are no volunteers, the organization is obviously a career department. Even if there are volunteers present to supplement the career staff, the department is still substantially career.

The minimum requirements address these organizations' objectives as well as their functions. Not surprisingly, the standard emphasizes three key areas of a successful operation: service delivery, capabilities and resources.

The standard sets forth the minimum criteria related to the effectiveness and the efficiency of public entities, which provide fire suppression, emergency medical service and special operations. Both efficiency and effectiveness are specifically related to protecting two groups: the public and fire department employees.

The Service delivery objectives found in the standard are specific requirements for deployment, staffing, response times and the necessary support systems. These support systems include safety and health, communications, incident command, pre-incident planning and training.

There are also three time components defined in the NFPA 1710 standard relating to emergency response system performance. All three components must be measured and documented by departments in their quadrennial report. These three components will be discussed later in the report. 

The NFPA 1710 Standard acknowledges that where fire and EMS response are concerned, many communities have decided to work together across geographic and municipal boundaries. The standard recognizes the existence and usefulness of mutual aid pacts in their various forms. It stipulates that these agreements must be in writing and that they must address certain specific concerns:

Ø      Liability

Ø      Disability retirements

Ø      Service costs

Ø      Staffing

Ø      Equipment

The standard requires that personnel from multiple organizations working at the scene of an incident must have common procedures in order to ensure safe operations. This can occur only if these personnel train together and are familiar with procedures and equipment that will be used to control an incident.

Finally, a crucial component of effective intercommunity response is adequate communication. The NFPA 1710 Standard mandates that these organizations be equipped with compatible communications equipment for that purpose.  

11710 FIRE SUPPRESSION Recommendations

The components of 1710’s related to Fire Suppression state that fire departments must be capable of establishing the following functions at each structural fire: incident command, water supply, attack lines, backup lines, search and rescue teams, ventilation teams and rapid intervention teams. These "benchmark" requirements are based upon a 2,000 square-foot detached single-family occupancy. Fire departments will have to deploy additional resources according to the occupancies and hazards in their jurisdiction.

The 1710 standard also requires that The total number of on-duty personnel is established by means of a task analysis that evaluates expected fire fighting deployment using the following factors:

o        Life hazards in the jurisdiction;

o        The safety and efficiency of fire fighters;

o        The potential property loss;

o        The nature, configuration, hazards and internal protection of properties within the response area

o        The department’s standard tactics and evolutions, apparatus deployed and expected results.

For example, a jurisdiction would need to evaluate all locations within its response area to determine those that have tactical hazards such as concentrated fire potential; high hazard occupancies such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, manufacturing complexes, refineries, or high-rise buildings; geographical restrictions that could result in a delayed response affecting the frequency, severity and spread of the fire occurrence; or other factors that would necessitate additional staffing per company and additional companies for the initial alarm assignment, additional alarm assignments and simultaneous emergencies. Collecting, analyzing and evaluating this information and data can then be used to establish total on-duty staffing needs.

This standard is also important because for the first time a standard defines what a Fire Company is. Companies are defined as either engine or truck (ladder) companies or specialized apparatus -- such as rescue or squad companies -- depending on the type of apparatus and the fire suppression functions that are performed.

Regardless of the type of company, each must consist of a group of trained and equipped fire fighters under the supervision of an officer who operates and arrives on the emergency scene with one piece of fire apparatus. The standard allows for an exception in those instances when multiple apparatus are used to make up a company. However, such exceptions require that these multi-piece companies are always dispatched at the same time and arrive together, are continuously operated together and are managed by a single company officer. The standard does however still require that even if this multiple vehicle approach is used that the department still adhere to the company response time guidelines, and that a company consist of four persons, more when high hazards exist.

The standard recognizes and clarifies the limited use of such multi-piece companies.

Examples include:

The use of a fire department personnel vehicle if the apparatus does not have adequate seating.

       where a water supply (hydrant or natural water bodies) is not available.

An engine and an EMS unit (ambulance or rescue). It should be noted that the  usefulness of such an assignment -- though allowed by the standard -- is questionable, especially if patient transport is provided, since the engine would always have to remain with the EMS unit to keep the company intact.

These company issues and definitions have developed into the buzz phrases “minimum staffing and “4 Person Minimum”.  The NFPA Technical Committee reviewed numerous studies, evaluations and stakeholder reports containing empirical data on departmental response and mitigation of fire. These studies clearly demonstrate that for safe, effective and efficient fire suppression, each responding company needs a minimum of four fire fighters.

In our review of staffing issues for the Franklin Fire Department a nine month exhausted search of studies was conducted including the use of the internet and the National Fire Academy Learning Resource Center, one the most comprehensive Fire department related libraries in the world, if not the most.

Through this search we were unable to find one study that argued the efficiency or safety of two-person engine companies, or the effectiveness of three-person engine companies over two person companies.

There are however numerous reports and other documentation that support the four-person minimum, some of them are as follows:

International City Managers Association, Municipal Fire Administration (Chicago, IL:ICMA) 1967; pp. 161-162.

The ICMA concluded that there must be enough personnel to put fire apparatus into effective use. It determined that a minimum of five personnel are required for engine (pumper) companies, three personnel are needed to place a single line of 2 ½-inch hose in service, and one additional person, plus a foreperson, is needed to operate a pump.

Kimball, Warren Y., Manning for Fire Attack (Boston, MA: NFPA) 1969.

This book thoroughly covers staffing of fire companies. In summary, effective fireground staffing was demonstrated to involve two fundamentals: first, carefully engineered equipment components designed to deliver specified fire extinguishing capacity under stated conditions and second, personnel assigned and used to deliver specified fire attack capabilities. In other words, the fire fighting capability of a fire department ultimately depends upon a complete systems approach and not a mere massing of random forces when an emergency occurs.

American Insurance Association, "Fire Department Efficiency," Special Interest Bulletin No. 131, December 1975.

Bulletin prepared by the American Insurance Association on fire department efficiency. Emphasis is placed on the importance of staffing companies with a minimum of four personnel. The bulletin further states that if companies are staffed with two or three personnel, they cannot perform the required functions of either an engine or ladder company.

American Insurance Association, "Fire Department Manning," Special Interest Bulletin No. 319, December 1975.

Bulletin prepared by the American Insurance Association on fire department staffing levels. Emphasis is placed on the importance of staffing companies with a minimum of four personnel. The bulletin further states that four personnel do not represent an adequately staffed company. It concludes with a statement that progressive fire chiefs believe a company should never respond with fewer than five or six personnel.

Cushman, Jon, Seattle, WA Fire Department’s "Abstract: Report to Executive Board, Minimum Manning as Health & Safety Issue," 1981.

This study, performed by the Seattle Fire Department, analyzed the link between staffing and fire fighter injuries by reviewing the average severity of injuries suffered by engine companies of fewer than four fire fighters as compared to companies with four or more fire fighters. The study concluded that the average time per disability increased as company strength decreased for both types of companies. This analysis indicated that the rate of fire fighter injuries expressed as total hours of disability per hours of fireground exposure were 54% greater for engine companies staffed with three personnel when compared to those staffed with four fire fighters, while companies staffed with five personnel had an injury rate that was only one-third that associated with four-person companies.

Gerard, John C. and Jacobsen, A. Terry, "Reduced Staffing: At What Cost?," Fire Service Today, September 1981; pp. 15-21.

This study concluded that an aggressive early initial interior attack on a working structural fire results in greatly reduced loss of life and property damage. Given that the progression of a structural fire to the point of flashover generally occurs in less than 10 minutes, two of the most important elements in limiting the spread of fire are the quick arrival of sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire as close to the point of its origin as possible.

National Fire Academy, Executive Development Program III, "Fire Engines are Becoming Expensive Taxi Cabs: Inadequate Manning," February 1981; pp. 2 & 4.

This NFA report summarizes a 1977 test conducted by the Dallas Fire Department, which consisted of a simulated fire involving several rooms at the rear of the third floor of an old school[1].  Although this report is nearly 25 years old it still remains as one of the premier studies regarding studies and it’s design has stood the test of time and technology.  Fires Still burn today just as they did in 1977, in fact with all of the increased use of polymers and plastics fires are increasingly burning Hotter and faster than they ever have.

This simulation was conducted to determine how long it took a three, four, or five-person team to advance its line to this area and get water on the fire. Immediately following those tasks, each individual’s physical condition was assessed. Timing began as each engine company entered the schoolyard.

The average time for the engine companies to complete the tasks is revealing. The three-person team average was 18.8 minutes. All personnel were exhausted, rubber legged, had difficulty standing up and were unfit for further fire fighting. The four- person team, conducting the very same test, averaged 10.29 minutes and upon completion, was nearing exhaustion. The five-person team averaged 6.15 minutes, and showed little evidence of fatigue at the end of the exercise.

McManis Associates and John T. O’Hagan and Associates, "Dallas Fire Department Staffing Level Study," June 1984; pp. I-2 & II-1 through II-7.

The Dallas Study is a benchmark study of the link between crew size and fire suppression effectiveness. This study was performed as a series of controlled evolutions on a specified set of fire situations using different components in the range of four to six people. Significantly, the study found that "fatigue was a serious problem for smaller groups." Indeed, the author of a 1993 memorandum concluded that this finding was relevant because it highlights the link between staffing and fire fighter deaths and injuries.

Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Review Board, Administrator of the Division of Occupational Safety & Health v. Clark County Fire Department (Statement of Position and Stipulation), Docket No. 89-385, October 1990.

Citing that the Clark County Fire Department had prior knowledge that units staffed with three personnel were unsafe, the Nevada Department of Occupational Safety and Health issued a complaint that the Fire Department had willfully violated the industry standards relating to fire fighter safety. In late 1990, the NDOSH agreed to vacate the violation when the Clark County Fire Department stipulated that it would immediately "maintain minimum staffing levels at each fire station so that no engine or ladder truck shall be dispatched from a fire station, staffed with less than four persons."

In addition, the stipulation entered into by NDOSH and the Fire Department stated that:

"Any engine or ladder truck manned with less than four persons shall be defined to be "unsafely manned."

Morrison, Richard C., "Manning Levels for Engine and Ladder Companies in Small Fire Departments," 1990.

The conclusions reached in the Dallas study were confirmed for small fire departments by the Westerville, Ohio Fire Department. Using standard fire fighting tactics, the results of the Westerville Fire Department report showed that four fire fighters could perform rescue of potential victims 80% faster than a three fire fighter crew.

International Association of Fire Fighters, "Analysis of Fire Fighter Injuries and Minimum Staffing Per Piece of Apparatus in Cities With Populations of 150,000 or More," December 1991.

This study was a comprehensive analysis of fire fighter injuries and minimum staffing levels in a number of cities. The study found that 69% of jurisdictions that maintained crew sizes of fewer than four fire fighters had fire fighter injury rates of 10 or more per 100 fire fighters, while only 38.3% of jurisdictions maintaining crew sizes of four or more fire fighters had comparable injury rates. In other words, jurisdictions having crew sizes of fewer than four fire fighters suffered a benchmark injury rate at nearly twice the percentage rate of jurisdictions that maintained crew sizes of four or more fire fighters.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Health Hazard Evaluation Reports for Sedgwick County, KS, Nos. HETA 90-395-2117 and HETA 90-395- 2121, June 1991.

This NIOSH report details a September 6, 1990, fire in Sedgwick County, Kansas that killed a 25-year-old fire fighter. The cause of death was determined to be heat stroke. In the discussion and findings section of the report, the issue of staffing was addressed as follows:

A two-fire fighter engine company is, at a minimum, 50% understaffed and increases the work effort by a factor of three. In a brushfire where one fire fighter operates the pump, the second is left to pull 200’ of booster through rough terrain covered with low- lying undergrowth. At the fatal fire, the pump was left unattended and each of the two fire fighters advanced a separate booster line up to 200’ in opposite directions from the engine.

Fire fighters operating at an emergency incident must always operate in teams of two or more. Such a buddy system permits fire fighters to share work, thereby reducing the metabolic heat they produce and reducing the heat stress.

Metro Chiefs/International Association of Fire Chiefs, "Metro Fire Chiefs - Minimum Staffing Position," May 1992.

In 1992, the Metro Fire Chiefs Division of the ICHIEFS not only endorsed assembling at least four fire fighters before initiating an interior attack, but went a step further stating: In order to permit the effective operation of fire companies at the scene of a structure fire, the minimum number of personnel on both engine and ladder companies should be five members per unit. This firm position was taken by the Metro Fire Chiefs solely in the interest of the safety of both the citizens "we serve and our nation’s fire fighters."

Office of the Fire Marshal of Ontario, "Fire Ground Staffing and Delivery Systems Within A Comprehensive Fire Safety Effectiveness Model," December 3, 1993.

In 1993, the Fire Marshal of Ontario (Canada) Research Project conducted a study to thoroughly examine the tasks which three and four-person crews could safely accomplish. The study specifically noted the crucial role played by response times in avoiding flashover conditions. It concluded that "after flashover, the opportunity for successful rescue from other areas in the structure rapidly diminishes." It also concluded that, once flashover occurs, "there is an increased fire fighting demand if intervention does not take place prior to flashover."

Onieal, Denis G., "In Response to the Demand for Fire Department Cutbacks," Ed.D, Fire Engineering, August 1993.

This study concludes that the only reliable available research data obtained under fire conditions indicate that four is the minimum staffing level for a fire fighting engine or ladder company. Cited research firmly and unequivocally concludes that for an engine company or ladder company, the minimum acceptable staffing level is four. That number of fire fighters is the minimum number required to successfully accomplish the fireground tasks required within an acceptable time period. Four is not the number at which negotiations begin, but it is the absolute bare minimum required for an effective and efficient fire company.

Roberts, Bill, Fire Chief, City of Austin, "The Austin Fire Department Staffing Study," March 1993.

In 1993, the Austin Fire Department conducted a study to determine whether companies staffed with four fire fighters were safer and more effective than the three- person companies the department was currently deploying. In order to compare the effectiveness of fire companies, the physiological impact on fire fighters and Austin fire department injury rates at various staffing levels, the Fire Department conducted drills consisting of a series of common fireground tasks divided into three scenarios: a simulated two-story residential fire; a simulated aerial ladder evolution; and a simulated engine company high-rise fire.

These simulations revealed that regardless of the experience, preparation or the training of fire fighters, loss of life and property increases when a sufficient number of personnel are not available to conduct the tasks required in an efficient manner. The severity and the degree of hazard increases until controlled or the fire passes the critical point. Consequently, the Austin Fire Department concluded that fire fighter effectiveness significantly improves when a company is increased from three to four personnel. In the two-story residential fire, the efficiency or time improvement between the three-person and four-person crew was 73%. In the aerial ladder evolution, the efficiency improvement between three-person and four-person crews was 66%. In the high-rise fire, the efficiency improvement between the three-person and four-person engine company crew was 35%.

In addition to the fireground simulation, the Austin Fire Department also reviewed injury reports involving 136 emergency incidents from 1989 to 1992 to which 1,938 fire fighters responded. The analysis revealed that the injury rate for four or five-person crews was 5.3 per 100 fire fighters while the three-person companies experienced an injury rate of 7.77 injuries per 100 fire fighters. The injury rate for three-person companies was 46% higher than the rate for larger crews.

National Fire Protection Association, "Decision of the Standards Council on the Complaint of M.E. Hines, Texas Commission on Fire Protection, concerning a Formal Interpretation on NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program," April 6, 1994.

In 1993, the NFPA included in its NFPA 1500 Consensus Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health a requirement addressing the minimum number of fire fighters necessary to initiate an offensive interior attack on a structural fire. This Tentative Interim Agreement (TIA) to the fire fighter safety standard states: "At least four members shall be assembled before initiating interior fire fighting operations at a working structural fire."

Consequently, in 1994, Mr. M.E. Hines, Director of the Texas Commission on Fire Protection, sought formal clarification from the NFPA on this issue. NFPA’s formal interpretation of how the four fire fighters should be assembled is as follows:

"…when a company is dispatched from a fire station together as a unit (which includes both personnel responding on or arriving with apparatus), rather than from various locations, the standard recommends that the company should contain a minimum of 4 fire fighters."

National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, August 1997.

The NFPA 1500 Standard contains minimum requirements for a fire service-related occupational safety and health program. These requirements are applicable to public, governmental, military, private and industrial fire department organizations providing rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, hazardous materials mitigation, special operations and other emergency services.

The following are pertinent excerpts from NFPA 1500:

2-1.2* The fire department shall prepare and maintain written policies and standard operating procedures that document the organization structure, membership, roles and responsibilities, expected functions and training requirements, including the following:

(a) The types of standard evolutions that are expected to be performed and the evolutions that must be performed simultaneously or in sequence for different types of situations

(b) The minimum number of members who are required to perform each function or evolution and the manner in which the function is to be performed

(c) The number and types of apparatus and the number of personnel that will be dispatched to different types of incidents

(d) The procedures that will be employed to initiate and manage operations at the scene of an emergency incident

6-4.1* The fire department shall provide an adequate number of personnel to safely conduct emergency scene operations. Operations shall be limited to those that can be safely performed by the personnel available at the scene. No member or members shall commence or perform any fire- fighting function or evolution that is not within the established safety criteria of the organizational statement as specified in 2-1.2 of this standard.

A-6-4.1 The limitation of emergency scene operations to those that can be safely conducted by the number of personnel on the scene is intended to reduce the risk of fire fighter death or injury due to understaffing. While members can be assigned and arrive at the scene of an incident in many different ways, it is strongly recommended that interior fire-fighting operations not be conducted without an adequate number of qualified fire fighters operating in companies under the supervision of company officers.

It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. The minimum acceptable staffing level for companies responding in high-risk areas should be five members responding or arriving with each engine company and six members responding or arriving with each ladder company. These recommendations are based on experience derived from actual fires and in-depth fire simulations and are the result of critical and objective evaluation of fire company effectiveness. These studies indicate significant reductions in performance and safety where crews have fewer members than the above recommendations. Overall, five member crews were found to provide a more coordinated approach for search and rescue and fire suppression tasks.

During actual emergencies, the effectiveness of companies can become critical to the safety and health of fire fighters. Potentially fatal work environments can be created very rapidly in many fire situations. The training and skills of companies can make a difference in the need for additional personnel and in reducing the exposure to safety and health risks to fire fighters where a situation exceeds their capabilities.

National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1410 Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack, 2000.

The NFPA 1410 Standard contains the minimum requirements for evaluating training for initial fire suppression and rescue procedures used by fire department personnel engaged in emergency scene operations. This standard specifies basic evolutions that can be adapted to local conditions and serves as a standard mechanism for the evaluation of minimum acceptable performance during training for initial fire suppression and rescue activities.

The following are pertinent excerpts from NFPA 1410:

3-2.2* In addition to the requirements set forth in 3-2.1, the company officer shall ensure that the following are accomplished in interior structural fires:

(1) At least two fire fighters enter the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmosphere and remain in visual or voice contact with each other at all times.

(2) At least two fire fighters are located outside the IDLH atmosphere.

(3) All fire fighters engaged in interior structural fire fighting use SCBA.

A-3-2.2 One of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere could be assigned an additional role, such as incident commander in charge of the emergency, or safety officer, as long as this individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any fire fighter working at the incident. Nothing in this section is meant to preclude fire fighters from performing rescue activities before an entire team has been assembled.

 In addition to the four-person minimum, if after performing the task analysis it is deemed that more than four are required, how do you determine whether five or six is the correct number? (5.2.2.1.2)

Deployment using the NFPA 1710 Standard’s mandatory requirements for a benchmark fire would typically be met by a response of two engines (each staffed with four members), a truck (staffed with four members) and a chief’s vehicle (staffed with a supervisory officer and an aide). However for a high hazard response, four engines, two ladders, a heavy rescue, an EMS unit and two chief vehicles may be required with additional staffing on each of the companies. The number of additional fire fighters above four is predicated on the specific duties to be accomplished at these high hazard locations as well as the time requirements associated with initiating these tasks.

The Technical Committee considered various studies in developing this section of the standard. Some of these studies are described below:

Casey, James F., "Manpower - How Much Do You Need?," Fire Engineering, October 1969; pp. 111-113.

James Casey concludes that staffing levels are the key to successful fire fighting operations. Response must be prompt and adequate. In order to ensure full potential of personnel and equipment, engine companies should be staffed with no fewer than five personnel. Ladder companies should be staffed with no fewer than six personnel.

Centaur Associates (conducted for FEMA), "Report on the Survey of Fire Suppression Crew Size Practices," June 30, 1982; pp. 18-20.

In 1982, the U.S. Fire Administration conducted a survey of over 150 fire departments to evaluate current crew size and standard response practices. The study determined that there was a direct correlation between fire fighter safety and the number of personnel on the initial fire attack. When asked to identify those factors most important in determining crew size and initial response, fire chiefs and city managers ranked crew safety at the top of the list.

International City Management Association, Managing Fire Services, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC:ICMA) 1988; pp. 119-120.

The ICMA cited various controlled and statistically-based experiments by jurisdictions and universities that reveal that if 16 trained fire fighters are not operating at the scene of a working fire within the critical time period, then dollar loss and injuries are significantly increased, as are the square feet of fire spread. Additionally, as fire fighting tactics were conducted for comparative purposes, five-person fire suppression companies were judged to be 100 percent effective in their task performance, four- person companies 65 percent effective and three-person companies 38 percent effective. Six-person companies are judged 20 percent faster than four person companies.

Brunacini, Alan V., "Shrinking Resources vs. Staffing Realities," NFPA Journal, May/June 1992; pp. 28 & 120.

Chief Alan Brunacini concludes that it is illogical to maintain that the requirements, capabilities and conditions of fire department operations differ from one place to another. Fire conducts, convects and radiates the same all over North America. As such, two fire fighters cannot conduct a primary search that requires six fire fighters for effective completion in a survivable time frame.

Bublitz, David -- Fire Chief, Franklin Wisconsin, Report to the City of Franklin Common Council on Fire Department Operations, January 2001,

The FFD generally staffs its fire apparatus with two or three personnel, depending upon staffing at each station and the type of alarm.  The department has relied upon multiple pieces of apparatus responding and mutual aid to provide enough personnel to handle fire within the City.  The fact that the FFD has been successful mitigating incidents to the degree they have is a direct result of the caliber of our personnel, their high level of dedication, and a function of fire typically faced.  It does however, run counter to current industry standards. 

When compared to NFPA Standards, including NFPA 1500, Fire department Occupational safety and Health Program, fire suppression units are understaffed.

 

Incident Deployment

In addition to individual vehicle/company staffing 1710 specifically deals with the topic of incident Deployment requirements.  Within the standard it references the requirements to be met by the initial full alarm assignment and what is the minimum number of persons required for this assignment? 1710-(5.2.3.2.2)

1710 states that the fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within the eight-minute response time. The number of people required falls between 13 and 18, depending on whether or not an aerial is used, if both engines/pumpers are being used provide attack and backup lines and if a safety officer is required.

“Chart A” is a list of required functions for the benchmark fire defined in the standard and the number of personnel required to be deployed to perform these functions:

“Illustration A” illustrates the charts benchmark requirements for a fire response to the room- and-contents fire in a 2,000 square-foot single-family occupancy, without a basement and with no exposures (adjacent buildings).

In an urban environment, with high population density dwellings in very close proximity, multi-family occupancies, industrial areas and high occupancy institutions -- including hospitals and schools -- the fire department’s response capability must be enhanced with additional Apparatus, personnel and resources for the initial alarm assignment.  This Scenario also does not account for an injured victims which would require addition personnel.

“Illustration B” shows the current Franklin Fire department deployment of personnel and apparatus and the ability to meet the NFPA 1710 full assignment benchmarks on the next page.

The overall intent of 1710 staffing requirement is to have Coordinated Simultaneous fire attack, but because of the lack of staff in the Franklin Fire Department we have to revert to a sequential fire attack method only completing some of the tasks that should be done, and in some cases simply not performing other duties at all until after mutual aid companies arrive.

In addition it should be noted that the figures represented on the previous page show the optimum staffing we are able to provide, as if all personnel were in quarters, and not on another call.

 Current call volume is an average of 8 calls per day, with and average call being approximately 1½ to 2 hours in length.  This calculates out to the fact that during a 24 hour shift on the average 12 to16 hours, half of the day, the on duty staff is only 8* personnel or less depending upon which unit(s) is/are busy.  In effect taking an additional two personnel out of the staffing this is graphically portrayed on the following page.

** Mutual Aid Companies are used but do not on average arrive with in NFPA 1710 Guidelines.


1710 Staffing Benchmarks
Chart A

Staff Req.

Incident command shall be established by the deployed supervisory chief officer outside of the hazard area for the overall coordination and direction of the initial full alarm assignment. A minimum of one supervisory chief officer shall be dedicated to this task.

1

The supervisory chief officers shall have staff aides deployed to them for purposes of incident management and accountability at emergency incidents. A minimum of one individual shall be dedicated to this task for each supervisory chief.

1

An uninterrupted water supply of a minimum 400 gpm for 30 minutes shall be established. An operator shall remain with each fire apparatus supplying a water flow to ensure uninterrupted water flow application shall maintain supply line(s).

1-2

An effective water flow application rate shall be established: 300 gpm from two handlines, one of which shall be an attack line with a minimum of 100 gpm and one of which shall be a back-up line with a minimum of 100 gpm. Attack and backup lines shall be operated by a minimum of two personnel each to effectively and safely maintain the line.

4

One support person shall be provided for each attack and backup line deployed to accomplish hydrant hookup and assist in line lays, utility control and forcible entry. This individual is allowed to be assigned as a member of the initial rapid intervention team (IRIT) if the fire department determines that the support person can abandon his/her tasks without placing any personnel in jeopardy.

2

A minimum of one search-and-rescue team shall be part of an initial interior attack. Each search-and-rescue team shall consist of a minimum of two personnel.

2

A minimum of one ventilation team shall be part of an initial interior attack. Each ventilation team shall consist of a minimum of two personnel to perform structure ventilation in coordination with the primary interior attack.

2

If an aerial device is used in operations, one person shall function as an aerial operator who shall remain at the primary control of the aerial device at all times.

0-2

An Initial Rapid Intervention Team (IRIT) shall be established that shall consist of a minimum of two properly equipped and trained personnel. When an incident escalates beyond the initial full alarm assignment, or when there is significant risk to fire fighters due to the magnitude of the incident, the Incident Commander shall upgrade the IRIT to a full Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) that consists of four dedicated, fully equipped and trained fire fighters.

0-2

The fire department shall have the capability for additional alarm assignments that can provide for additional personnel, resources and additional services and the provision of support activities for those situations that are beyond the capability of the initial alarm assignment.

?

A safety officer shall be dispatched to a initial alarm assignment when significant risks to fire fighters are present and shall be deployed to all emergencies that go beyond an initial full alarm. A minimum of one individual shall be dedicated to this task.

0-1

 

 


Illustration A


Illustration B



The following are synopses of some of the studies considered in developing this section of the standard:

National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 197 Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack, 1966.

NFPA 197 was the precursor to NFPA 1410. This historic standard set forth the evolutions required for an initial interior attack on working structural fires. The minimum standard required a sufficient number of fire fighters and equipment to deploy two 1½" attack lines conveying at least 150 gpm within 60 seconds of arrival, followed by a 2½" backup line providing at least 250 gpm within 180 seconds of arrival.

While NFPA 197 did not specify the number of fire fighters necessary to deliver this required flow, it does specify the tasks that must be performed within a given time period. Although NFPA 197 was silent on the minimum number of fire fighters necessary to safely conduct these evolutions, the NFPA clearly defined in its book, Fire Attack-1, the number of personnel required. Adherence to NFPA 197 required two pumpers and a ladder truck with a total complement of at least 15 personnel.

International City Management Association, Managing Fire Services, (Washington, DC:ICMA) 1979; pp. 80, 214-215, & 218-219.

The ICMA subscribed to NFPA 197 Standard on resource deployment but also endorsed the NFPA’s definition relating to the number of personnel required to conduct those initial interior attack operations. Initial attack criteria codified in NFPA 197 and reemphasized in the Fire Protection Handbook is a minimum of 12 to 15 personnel plus a chief.

Ohio State University/Columbus Fire Division, "Measuring Firefighting Effectiveness," September 15, 1980.

This is a study performed by Ohio State University of 404 actual fire incidents to which the Columbus Fire Department responded. It concluded that there exists a "negative statistical correlation between the size of the fire fighting complement and the probability of fire fighter injury." In fact, the study found that the fire fighter injury rate for two different types of responses was 22 percent and 59 percent, respectively, for fires where 14 or fewer fire fighters responded, as compared to 15 percent and 34 percent, respectively, for fires where 15 or more fire fighters responded.

National Fire Academy, "Fire Risk Analysis: A Systems Approach," student manual, National Emergency Training Center, NFA-SM-FRAS, July 20, 1984.

In 1984, the National Fire Academy introduced the training manual Fire Risk Analysis: A System’s Approach. The manual stated that suppression capability must be measured to include both initial attack operations that attempt to quickly deal with marginal situations before they get out of control, and sustained fire fighting procedures that can be put into operation against major fires. In addition to the ability to apply water to the fire, the analysis emphasized that the fireground workforce must be of sufficient size in order to simultaneously have the ability "to engage in search and rescue, forcible entry, ventilation, preservation of property, and additional support activities as required by the situation." The NFA manual further stated that time is a critical factor in determining the effectiveness of the tasks with the expectation for the fire to increase until sufficient personnel are assembled to overcome it. Based on the above objectives, the U.S. Fire Academy concluded that the safety conduct of an effective interior attack required at least 15 personnel.

Phoenix, AZ Fire Department," Fire Department Evaluation System (FIREDAP)," December 1991; p. 1.

The FIREDAP Study was initiated by the NFPA as part of its Urban Forums activities to objectively evaluate fireground operations and precisely identify the tasks and functions required to safely and efficiently conduct an interior attack. The project’s Select Committee included representatives from seven jurisdictions, as well as the U.S. Fire Administration, the ICMA, ICHIEFS, IAFF, the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) and a number of technical subject matter experts. The observational study gathered empirical data from validated fireground simulations for the purpose of providing a comprehensive list of all key tasks that must be performed to rapidly and effectively confine a fire. Based upon these findings, the Select Committee concluded that control of an emergency incident is a function of how these specific tasks are performed. The Committee also relied on the findings to establish deployment criteria for a benchmark structural fire; command evolutions for a third alarm structural fire; and deployment criteria on a single patient medical response using BLS engines, ALS engines and ambulances.

In an attempting to reduce staffing by having two companies be replaced by one, i.e. the implementation of a quint[2] apparatus the section referring to quint apparatus, it states that if the company is expected to perform multiple roles simultaneously, that additional staffing shall be provided. How much additional staffing is required is not specific.

(5.2.2.4) When jurisdictions use "quint" apparatus, the standard requires that these units be designated as either an engine or a truck company, unless the jurisdiction expects multiple roles (i.e. engine and truck company functions) to be performed simultaneously from this unit. If such is the case, the standard requires that additional staffing, beyond the four-member minimum, be provided for such companies.

 

Staffing Problems

Currently the City of Franklin Fire Department’s Organizational Structure is as follows with the most glaring issue regarding current staffing levels is the fact that two of three fire stations currently staffed in the City of Franklin are staff with only 2 personnel.

This is suppose to be the Minimum department staffing level, a starting point, however as you will see there are times, and with increasing frequency, that department is not staffed with this level of staffing. 

 

Franklin Fire Department Current Optimal Daily Staffing

Station

Staffing

Assigned Response Units

Station #1

1 Battalion Chief

3 Firefighter / Paramedics
  
One may be a Lieutenant

2 Firefighters / EMT’s

1 Extra Firefighter When Available.

1 Paramedic Ambulance

1 BLS/PFR Ambulance

1 Ladder Truck

1 Engine

1 Tanker

1 Chief Officer’s Car

Station #2

1 Fire Lieutenant/Paramedic

1 Firefighter / EMT
1 Extra Firefighter When Available.

1 BLS/PFR Ambulance

1 Fire Engine

1 Brush Truck

1 Support Vehicle

Station #3

1 Fire Paramedic may be a Lieutenant

1 Firefighter / EMT

1 BLS/PFR Ambulance

1 Fire Engine

1 Spare Ambulance

The Battalion Chief is assigned to Station #1, in his absence a Lieutenant moves to station #1 to be in charge.

The minimum staffing on Paramedic units is only 2 paramedics, 3 paramedics are optimal but current policy is not to fill with a 3rd paramedic if overtime has to be paid.

The minimum staffing of 2 Firefighter/EMT’s is optimal, numerous times in 2001  a BLS Ambulance was been taken out of service, rather than fill all of the positions

Current policy only requires that each day only have 1 Lieutenant or an acting officer assigned to the East side of the City.  In addition there are no requirements to maintain a paramedic and thus the (PFR) Paramedic First Responder vehicle on the East side of the city at either station.

 

From this starting point you must remember that the department’s call volume in 2001 average approximately 8 calls a day with number currently averaging nearly 10 calls per day.  With and average call being conservitley estimated at 1 to1 1/2 hours in length.  This would calculate to between 10 -15 hours more than half of the day that, the on duty staff is only 8 personnel or less depending upon which unit(s) are busy.  The most frequent calls we respond to are EMS calls and depending upon the type of call and which unit transports the call frequently last 1 ½ hours to 2 hours and account for our estimation that, on average, staffing is actually closer to 8 persons for the majority of the day.  The Chief has augmented staffing during the day hours Monday through Friday.

This was calculated using on scene time of 15 for BLS and 25 min for ALS call, plus average transport times and the required time to return to the city.  For example: a 2-person BLS transport averages over an hour in length time the two personnel on the unit.  An ALS transport averages over an hour and in length, times the three personnel on the unit plus the additional 2 people on the BLS for the on scene portion of the call for calls within Franklin, thus a ALS call transport call would account for nearly 5 man hours.

 

Staffing Level Comparisons

The questions that is always asked is how do we compare to other cities our size and although this is a important question to ask we must not forget that the purpose of the 1710 standard is not to help fire departments justify keeping up with neighboring fire departments to set a standard for safe fire department operations.

 

City

Sq. Miles

Pop.

Stations

Full-Time Staff

Min. Amb. Staffing

Min. Engine Staffing

Brookfield

26.8